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The “global carbon age” marks a structural change far beyond the economic realms 
of implementing carbon trade, affecting the fabric of global environmental 
governance and its actors. Carbon trade and conservation in the Global South have 
taken on various forms, and climate change mitigation efforts in light of continued 
rainforest deforestation are scrambling to establish effective approaches. Ecuador’s 
Yasuní-ITT Initiative proposes a new global carbon-and-conservation model in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon that leaves oil reserves of the Yasuní Ishpingo Tambococha 
Tiputini (ITT) oil fields underground, in exchange for international compensation 
payments that would be based on voluntary contributions of governments and non-
governmental actors in an international conservation partnership and trust fund 
under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme. This model 
suggests far-reaching consequences, as it introduces new global scales for the 
sharing and management of environmental costs within a framework of neoliberal 
cost internalization. The analysis in this paper uses the concept of the “ecological 
state” (Duit, 2008) as a theoretical point of departure to examine the trans-scalar 
implications of such a carbon-and-conservation model on global governance 
structures toward a “global ecological state” (or global eco-state).  
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Introduction: Globalization of Environmental Services, ‘Carbon Colonies’, and the State 
The twenty-first century marks a beginning of new globalized conservation approaches 
between multi-national actors and the state, in an attempt to mitigate the alarming levels of land 
degradation and deforestation that have created considerable environmental problems from local 
to global (Turner, Lambin, & Reenberg, 2007; Pan, Carr, Barbieri, Bilsborrow, & Suchindran, 
2007; Carr, Suter & Barbieri, 2006) . These new globalized approaches introduce political forms 
of engagement that intensify trans-scalar relationships not only between actors but also in terms 
of the roles of the state within the overall fabric of conservation governance.  
Ecuador’s Yasuní-ITT Initiative represents one such new type of global carbon-and-
conservation arrangement, with a novel involvement of the state in search of conservation and 
carbon emission reductions. Ecuador faces one of the highest rates of deforestation in South 
America, and the Ecuadorian Amazon, in particular, has become an epicenter of clashes between 
conservation and extraction pressures due to a recent petroleum boom and large unexploited oil 
reserves in the region. The region boasts some of the highest endemic biodiversities in the world 
and has become a global focus of concern due to its tropical deforestation (Mosandl, Günter, 
Stimm, & Weber, 2008), indigenous land rights (Bebbington, 1997; Yashar, 1998; Valdivia, 
2007; Madrid, 2008), forest livelihoods and poverty reduction (Wunder & Alban, 2007), 
plantations and monocultures (Gerber, Veuthey, & Martínez-Alier, 2009), socio-ecological 
impacts of oil and gas drilling (San Sebastian & Hurtig, 2004; Sawyer, 2007; Finer, Vijay, 
Ponce, Jenkins, & Kahn, 2009; Southgate, Wasserstrom, 2010; Suarez et al., 2009; Warnars, 
2010), and economic dependencies on hydrocarbon extraction (Sawyer, 2004).  
The Yasuní-ITT initiative was launched in an attempt to prevent further direct and 
indirect deforestation pressures on the region from the extraction of oil (Mosandl et al., 2008). 
The initiative was announced in 2007 by President Rafael Correa as a plea for international help 
in order to forgo extractive activities and preserve the cultural and biological diversity of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon. The Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputini (ITT) oil fields within Yasuní National 
Park on the border with Peru carry an estimated 900 million barrels of heavy crude oil, 
representing as much as approximately 20% of the entire country’s oil reserves (Holly, 2007). 
For comparison, this tremendous reserve could provide supply for as many as ten days of the 
entire global oil consumption based on current rates (Rival, 2010). The economic value of the 
area’s untapped petroleum is estimated at more than 7 billion US dollars, 
assuming an oil price of above $61per barrel (Larrea & Warnars, 2009). Although the area is a 
National Park, active oil extraction continues due to oil concessions that had been granted prior 
to its protection. The Yasuní-ITT initiative now offers to halt extractive development within this 
partial area in exchange for 3.6 billion dollars, half the estimated value of the oil in the ITT block 
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Figure: Yasuní National Park and the relative location of the ITT oil block. Source: Bass et al. 
2010.  
 
The initiative has received the widespread attention of multiple international actors from 
governmental and non-governmental realms. As a carbon and conservation cooperation model 
(CCCM), it encapsulates several conservation-related mechanisms: a climate change measure, by 
the fostering of carbon sinks with a combined estimated storage capacity of 410 metric tons of 
carbon; a financial measure to foster new and more comprehensive strategies of sustainable 
development in Ecuador; and a new protection mechanism fostering biological and cultural 
diversity within Ecuador (Larrea & Warnars, 2009).  
The global approach of the Yasuní-ITT initiative and its new type of engagement with 
multi-national actors transcends the economic aspects of carbon trade and affects the actors and 
scales of environmental cooperation, political cultures, and governance structures, including a 
shift of the roles of the state. Environmental degradation and land use change have already been 
found to be increasingly exacerbated by global influences and dependencies (Lambin, Turner, 
Geist, et al. 2001). The commodification of carbon permeates this process on several levels as it 
shapes new international scales of interest and leads to adverse effects, especially in the Global 
South. Lohmann (2005, p. 204), for example, identifies a new economic value of a “carbon dump 
commodity,” which represents not only a new category of valoration related to the environment 
but also introduces a new globalization mechanism by offshoring carbon problems. Carbon 
emitting and carbon sequestering regions logically continue the long-standing globalization of 
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outsourcing and allocating carbon funds where they offer the biggest investment return. 
Commodity chains are dissembled into elements of different cost intensities, and lead to an 
outsourcing of carbon sequestering to the Global South, where forest offsets and environmental 
performance improvements in industrial processes are less cost-intensive and provide higher 
rates of emission benefits (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008). From a postcolonial standpoint, this 
represents a rather ironic transformation—Ecuador has gone from a former resource colony to a 
modern carbon colony, specializing in yet another environmental commodity that is in economic 
demand from the Global North.  
Ecuador’s President Correa fittingly advertised the Yasuní Initiative as part of a strategy 
which would shift Ecuador “from an extractive type of economy to a service economy,” in which 
the country “would be selling services to the rest of the world” (Correa, 2009). As such, Correa 
may have tried to portray Ecuador as a carbon superpower that can draw on enormous new-
found wealth that can be marketed according to the rules of a new global economy.  
The power relationships behind carbon exchange, however, also lead to a concern about 
modern “carbon colonies,” explored further, for example, by Bachram (2004) and Bridge (2010). 
They highlight the underlying power implications of an unresolved and growing “carbon divide” 
between the Global North and the Global South. Bebbington and Bebbington (2011) critique the 
enclosure and commodification of subterranean resources in Ecuador—as well as in Peru and 
Bolivia—as part of a broader power struggle and reordering of Latin America’s position in the 
global political economy. The process, they argue, bears signs of reproducing a classic core-
periphery relationship. Bridge (2010, p. 6) similarly identifies “strikingly uneven geographies of 
fossil fuels and carbon offsetting”1 that show “tendencies to reproduce a North/South geography 
of core-periphery.” In this way, carbon offsetting mirrors the same form of “unequal ecological 
exchange” through which oil is extracted from the global periphery and becomes inserted into 
the infrastructures in the core, where they reinforce the industrialized countries’ superior levels 
of productivity (Hornborg, 2006). Beyond material carbon flows, Bridge (2010) further identifies 
“carbon control,” “carbon conduct,” and “carbon mobilization” as commodified aspects in 
carbon economies, which also opens up larger questions of governance and social constructions 
surrounding the commodification of carbon, and, ultimately, carbon’s “social metabolism” 
(Clark & York, 2005; Prudham, 2009) as it affects global relationships of resources, states, and 
their interests.  
Even as new conservation models expand and illustrate the challenges of global 
environmental cooperation, climate change has created a sense of urgency that pressures 
governments toward pragmatic, timely, and effective action, especially where environmental 
exploitation and changing land use policies immediately threaten to turn further “carbon forests” 
into “carbon bombs” (Staddon, 2009). Carbon trade may represent a country’s strategic direction 
in search of economic alternatives to natural resource extraction and ecological depletion, but the 
urgency of the issue in the context of the Yasuní has also led to critiques that Ecuador would be 
using its carbon sinks for political leverage. In February 2012, for example, the Chicago Tribune 
featured an article called “Ransoming Paradise – Should the world bribe Ecuador to protect that 
country’s rainforest?” (Chicago Tribune, 5 Feb 2012). Time Magazine also published a report 
about the Yasuní in December 2011 that was bluntly titled “Rain Forest for Ransom.” It argued 
that “the Yasuní plan would be a first for global environmental policy: recognition that the 
international community has a financial responsibility to help developing nations preserve nature 
. . . . Of course, from another perspective, the Yasuni initiative might look like environmental 
blackmail: Pay us or the forest gets it” (Time Magazine, 19 Dec 2011). Overall, however, both 
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articles agree to some extent that the Yasuní plan is a risky proposal with difficult potential 
outcomes, yet both ultimately conclude that global conservation interests speak in the plan’s 
favor.   
Overall, the ecological urgency of slowing biodiversity loss and climate change—among 
many other environmental concerns—feeds the pragmatic argument that to be fast and effective, 
environmental approaches will need to develop strategies that work with, rather than against, the 
economic interest mechanisms of a neoliberal framework. Accordingly, global carbon trade 
introduces an internalization of environmental costs as a new economic recognition of ecological 
processes. Another argument in favor of global carbon deals is that of scale itself: climate change 
requires global approaches in order to address the problem on the scale at which it occurs. From 
this perspective, a global-level internalization of environmental costs offers the sort of potential 
that smaller approaches desperately lack. These new arrangements often center on the state as a 
facilitator, beneficiary, solicitor, and regulator, to an extent that exceeds prior roles of the 
sovereign state and ventures into complex terrain that has yet to be defined, the implications of 
which are yet to be explored.  
The Yasuní proposal has similarities with debt-for-nature swaps, which emerged in the 
1980s as a financial mechanism for the Global South to reduce their foreign debt while 
protecting the environment. Ecuador has entered such debt-for-nature swaps in the past, such as 
when The Nature Conservancy and World Wildlife Fund agreed in 1987 to take over USD 10 
million of Ecuador’s foreign debt (Lewis, 2007). At the same time, however, the Yasuní 
Initiative takes the idea to a different level. President Correa’s initial proposal in 2007 envisioned 
a compensation package (USD 350 million per year for 10 years) in direct proportion to the 
relinquished oil revenues (around USD 7 billion, based on current market prices). Several 
deadlines have come and gone since that time, as the initiative is waiting to gain sufficient 
support to commence. As such, since its initial announcement, the proposal has evolved into an 
international brainstorming and negotiation of possible arrangements covering types of 
compensation, carbon trade channels, local community benefits, financial controls, performance 
assessment, and enforcement mechanisms.  
If a globally embedded pilot project like the Yasuní-ITT agreement goes forward, it 
raises questions about the political implications for global relationships of carbon, power, 
economic interests, the roles of the state within global carbon-and-conservation deals, and 
emerging global scales of cost internalization. The proposed agreement suggests an 
internalization of environmental costs, but instead of remaining within the national economy, the 
proposal extends the internalization of costs to a global scale between different international 
entities. This has profound implications on governance, power, sovereignty, and the neocolonial 
dependence of states in the face of carbon globalization. The Yasuní-ITT initiative is embedded 
in a larger political shift in which Ecuador’s ecological conservation has already become highly 
internationalized and simultaneously gained strong traction on the national agenda. The Yasuní 
agreement creates a political action space, the success of which depends on the implementation 
of its environmental governance across the scales, pending the dangers of “carbon colonies” and 
the prospects of effective carbon initiatives among equal international partners.  
In order to understand these implications in practice, this article examines the Yasuní-ITT 
case as a political project that exemplifies new relationships between conservation, multi-
national interests, and the state in the global carbon era. The data is based on a literature review 
of government documents and reports from local to global policy actors, academic literature, 
interview and media data collected from key policy actors, international news services, and 
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national radio broadcasts between 2007 and 2012. The analysis uses the “ecological state” (Duit, 
2008) as a theoretical point of departure for the changing roles of the state vis-à-vis global 
carbon-and-conservation models. The idea of the ecological state is based on a neoliberal 
framing of cost internalization, which argues that translating ecological processes and “costs” 
into the capitalist economy would help to counteract the market’s environmentally destructive 
forces by assigning values to processes that would otherwise remain unaccounted for. The 
ecological state, therefore, falls in line with the current arguments for global carbon trade and 
payments for environmental services. At the same time, however, the ecological state calls for a 
system outside neoliberal deregulation because it assigns a central role to the state—as that of a 
strong regulator as opposed to a weak market enabler—and places the state itself in the business 
of producing and sustaining public environmental goods (Duit, 2008). These characteristics 
make the ecological state an interesting theoretical concept for analysis for several reasons. It 
views the roles of states within global carbon deals in a similar fashion, as they were conceived 
by their own neoliberal arrangements, which then allows us to examine their implications for the 
state over time as global carbon-and-conservation models take shape. The concept’s emphasis on 
the state as the central authority for cost internalization also mirrors the strong position of the 
government in the Yasuní-ITT initiative and allows for a particular focus on the state in the 
analysis.  
Even more importantly for the focus of this analysis, the basic concept offers a 
particularly interesting point of entry for the globalization element of carbon-and-conservation 
arrangements in global environmental governance: trans-national scales of cost internalization. 
Using the context of the Yasuní-ITT initiative, this article therefore explores applications of the 
ecological state beyond the basic concept into trans-national scales and discusses the dynamics 
and implications of a possible “global ecological state,” in short, a “global eco-state,” with 
regard to the roles of the state vis-à-vis trans-national interests and conservation. 
The article starts with an introduction of the concept of the ecological state (section 2) 
and discusses how the concept applies to carbon-and-conservation approaches and Ecuador’s 
political context (section 3). The analysis then presents the significance of and threats to the 
Ecuadorian Amazon and the Yasuní region in particular, including conflict within the region 
(section 4), and examines the global driving factors of the Yasuní-ITT initiative and political 
momentum surrounding it (section 5). The analysis then introduces global modifications of the 
concept of the ecological state to discuss Ecuador’s conservation dynamics in light of new global 
carbon-and-conservation agreements such as the Yasuní-ITT initiative (section 6). The article 
then transfers these larger observations into a review of the conservation model and its potential 
indications about new global networks and the global eco-state, and concludes with a short 
summary of the challenges surrounding the initiative and emerging dynamics (section 7).   
 
The Ecological State – Basic Concept and ‘Going Global’ 
 
The “ecological state” emphasizes the efforts and capacities of the state in creating 
proactive policies for a cost internalization of environmental externalities. On the surface, the 
notion of an ecological state seems to mirror current neoliberal trends of the commodification of 
elements of nature, but it shares deeper conceptual and historical roots with the political notion 
of the welfare state. The ecological state and the welfare state share basic functions for the 
public, as they both attempt to mitigate negative market externalities and, more specifically, 
social and environmental costs. Environmental externalities are created when the market does 
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not accurately account for the environmental impacts that result from the lifecycle of goods from 
production to disposal (Christoff, 2005). In the larger terms of welfare state research, the state 
could be understood as a an institutional mechanism that ensures market functionality by 
counterbalancing the cost-externalizing pressures of capitalist economies (Therborn, 1987; Duit, 
2008), or even as a politically motivated buffer against these forces (Pierson, 2000). 
Duit (2008) suggests four major categories of ecological states that are distinguished 
based on the power and involvement of government and governance systems: thick, civic, 
centralized, and thin ecological states. Thick and civic eco-states are characterized by high levels 
of influence from international and national governance systems. They differ in the level of 
government influence (from high in thick states to low in civic states). Thin and centralized 
ecological states have low levels of 
influence by governance systems (with 
low levels of government involvement in 










Figure 1: Categorization of Ecological States based on Government and Governance.  
Source: Duit (2008)    
The state itself—with its formal political structure—is the most important actor in 
creating an ecological state. This is for two reasons: First, the government is the ultimate entity 
of decision-making power and implementation. It has legislative and jurisdictive power over the 
policies and practices of natural resource use (Duit, 2008). Second, the government is the central 
entity in drawing market regulations away from inherently destructive dynamics of the profit-
seeking private sector. A neoliberal economic framework would therefore—if at all—favor a 
thin eco-state, since government intervention and governance controls would be more restrictive 
in the other three systems. Christoff (2005) even suggests the degree of neoliberalism in a state 
as a mechanism by which to classify ecological states, with thick and civic eco-states having low 
levels of neoliberal structures. 
Ecological states are those that successfully manage to mitigate environmental 
externalities through the establishment of projects and public services, usually through legislative 
and fiscal mechanisms through the state (Duit, 2008) and by establishing environmental 
regulations that force the private sector to internalize environmental costs into their economic 
processes. This view clashes with environmental skepticism, which identifies adverse 
mechanisms of the state driven by lobbyism, political economies of resource dependence, and an 
inherent interest of the government in economic growth, regardless of external costs. The 
ecological state, however, assumes that there are functioning mechanisms already in place. 
Consequently, Duit (2008) argues that a thick eco-state would be the most stable form of 
ecological state, since it ensures high levels of involvement by government and governance 
systems as a regulatory authority against the exploitation interests of the private sector. His 
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examples of thick eco-states include Denmark, Germany, and Sweden, representing some of the 
most renowned emerging eco-states of the twenty-first century.  
The ecological state requires a broader examination of “external” environmental 
obligations and interests, which pushes the paradigms of scope surrounding national economies, 
state roles, and responsibilities across broader spatial and temporal scales. In addition, eco-states 
are ideally supported by institutions and international agreements, which are beneficial in 
creating new ideas and pressuring other institutions and governments to adopt these ideas. This 
stresses the need for complementary political engagement within the ecological state to ensure 
functioning discursive and regulatory control mechanisms that are open to spheres of interaction 
between responsible government, citizen participation, grassroots movements, international 
cooperation, and other global actors.  
This is where trans-national scales become relevant. Given the global realities of 
contemporary governance, states often do not have much of a choice whether they want to “go 
global.” State-level processes are embedded in a larger political environment in which the state 
needs to adapt to emerging trans-national forms of engagement in economic and environmental 
governance amongst a rise of a “globalized” civil society with newly recognized global scales of 
environmental interests and problems. Transboundary and global scales of ecological 
degradation challenge the ability of states to address the problem successfully. They created a 
new interest of the state in the environment as an issue of national and geopolitical importance 
(i.e. as one of national security) (McCarthy, 2007) or as a foundation of national identities 
(Radcliffe, 2001). This shift changes previous assumptions of the sovereign state as it moves 
away from formalized decision-making structures to an emerging pluralism and political 
relativity from a plethora of influences. Trans-national forms of engagement open up new 
political spaces of discourse and agency for a mutual development of agendas, as opposed to a 
priori decisions on their content and modes of engagement (Radcliffe, 2001). 
Global agreements for environmental goods and services are not far from the conceptual 
assumptions of the ecological state; such agreements take the premises of the ecological state 
further beyond the sovereign state. Ecosystem service payments represent a contractual exchange 
of the economic value of a commodified good or service such as conservation, albeit in a 
simplified economic approximation, which cannot translate the full complexity of ecological 
processes, though they may at least try to capture key elements of concern. This makes 
ecosystem service payments a typical mechanism of an ecological state, but only if the payments 
are actually internalizing environmental costs, and not selling them to “external” actors 
considered outside the scope of their own economy. Consequently, a global sale of ecosystem 
services from Ecuador does not make Ecuador itself an ecological state as long as the national 
economy is considered the only relevant unit. It would rather represent an outsourcing process 
toward a global division of environmental services between countries with high conservation and 
those with high pollution, thus encouraging business as usual in the latter. This could go as far as 
entire regions or countries repositioning themselves as ecological service areas, thus superficially 
suggesting a marketable “eco-state” label without any internal mechanisms in place. 
On a global level, however, ecosystem service payments between countries could be 
regarded as  a mechanism of cost internalization because they consider the larger scale of the 
entire planet. This is in line with new scalar perspectives on ecological connectivity, which 
increasingly point out that negative environmental effects do not vanish but simply reappear in 
other spatial or temporal scales, pushing boundaries on the political grasp of internal vs. external 
costs. Environmental public goods have an inherently global connotation—that of global 
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ecosystems—which resonates with a larger global idea of the ecological state in that the 
ecological state seeks to internalize socio-environmental costs in the unit that matters the most: 
the planet. The analysis uses a globalized form of the concept of the ecological state in order to 
examine these inter-scalar dependencies of environmental costs, here presented as the global 
eco-state. This approach does not regard international involvement as add-on elements to the 
state, but rather views these connectivities on global scales as inherent elements that root the 
motivation and goals of a new, emerging type of ecological state in the twenty-first century. 
 
Ecuador vis-a-vis Ideas of an Eco-State 
 
Ecuador’s economic history is deeply intertwined with petroleum due to the fact that its 
national interests were typically closer to those of an environmentally destructive “petro-state” 
than to those of an environmentally protective “eco-state” (Valdivia, 2008; Finer & Martin, 
2010). Since the 1970s, Ecuador has seen oil extraction become a strong driver of its economic 
growth, and its Amazon region is under particularly strong pressure as a revenue source for the 
national economy. The region is home to abundant petroleum reserves under existing extraction 
concessions as well as in yet undeveloped reserves. So far, more than 65% of the Ecuadorian 
Amazon has already been divided into licensed blocks (Finer, Jenkins, Pimm, Keane, & Ross, 
2008) for hydrocarbon extraction. The first oil extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon started in 
1967 by Texaco, and oil exports followed in 1972 (San Sebastian & Hurtig, 2004; Larrea & 
Warnars, 2009). The petroleum industry has been the largest contributor to economic growth in 
Ecuador since the 1970s (San Sebastian & Hurtig, 2004). The GDP per capita rose drastically 
between 1972 and 2008 from 312 dollars to 3,856 US Dollars (United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2012), which was largely attributed to the growing oil industry (San Sebastian & 
Hurtig, 2004; US Department of State, 2010).  
The amount of deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon has created a variety of 
detrimental ecological impacts by reducing the connectivity of ecosystems and habitats, through 
fragmentation caused by a network of industrial operations, connecting roads, and pipelines. 
Forests hold important ecological functions as “sinks” for carbon dioxide, the preservation of 
which is part of a regional conservation and reforestation focus through a variety of national and 
international campaigns such as the Socio Bosque Programme in Ecuador, the United Nations 
Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Developing Countries (REDD), and the Dutch initiated Forests Absorbing Carbon-dioxide 
Emissions Forestation Programme (Wunder & Alban, 2007; United Nations REDD Programme, 
2009). Habitat loss and fragmentation reduce the populations of species, and, ultimately, reduce 
the biological diversity in the area (Bass et al., 2010).  
Over the last few decades, there has been increased recognition of the environmental 
importance of Ecuador’s biodiversity, boosted by the 1992 Rio Summit and ensuing international 
funding for environment-development projects in the Global South. As a result, Ecuador has 
seen tremendous change as new international environmental interests entered the scene. Since 
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Ecuador has witnessed an immense boom of environmental non-
governmental organizations, international political engagement, and conservation initiatives. Its 
ecosystems became the target of multiple global interests of environment and climate change 
politics, media, and science, through which it entered a new level of global attention (Bass et al., 
2010). Waves of scientific interest, international funding, conservation projects, media coverage, 
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ecotourism, and the rise of tourism in general contributed to an increased awareness of the 
ecosystemic wealth associated with the country’s natural environment.  
 
Conflicts and Threats in Ecuador’s Amazon Region and Yasuní 
 
The ecological significance of the Yasuní has been recognized for years and is gaining 
increasing attention due to growing threats and conflicts in the region, ranging from biodiversity 
loss and habitat fragmentation to conflicts over resource extraction, land ownership, and cultural 
traditions. Part of the region was already put under protection as a National Park in 1979. The 
area represents “one of the world’s last high-biodiversity wilderness areas,” with world-record 
levels of species richness, global diversity maxima for amphibians, birds, mammals, and tree 
communities, and field data that even surpassed the IUCN database total number of species 
known (Bass et al., 2010). Most scientific attention and research in the region has accelerated 
only recently but nonetheless potentially consolidates a new interest and recognition of the 
ecological importance of the region. In 1989, the entire transition zone surrounding the protected 
areas became a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve (INEFAN, 1989). Nearly a decade later, in 2007, 
the government of Ecuador declared an “Intangible Zone” within the National Park, an area of 
7,580 square kilometers in the south and center of the protected area. It specifically declared 
resource extraction off-limits in order to maintain the area’s ecological and cultural integrity for 
remaining indigenous groups that live in voluntary isolation from the outside world.  
Despite the region’s formally declared protection and recognized significance, petroleum 
extraction continues in the Yasuní. Concessions had already been approved in the region in the 
1970s, long before the area’s declaration as a National Park, due to which the concessions were 
legally able to continue. In 2008, the government of Ecuador and President Correa further 
declared that there would be no new approvals granted for extractive activities within any 
protected areas in Ecuador. However, previously authorized activities, such as Block 15 in the 
Northwest corner of Yasuní National Park, continue to be legal because they had been active 
before the declaration. Block 15 is one of the most productive concessions in Ecuador, 
representing as much as 1/5 of Ecuador’s oil production in 2005 (Save America’s Forests, 2005).  
Further oil exploration and road development is feared because it could lead to a domino 
effect in the region. Approximately 20-30% of the ITT oil fields reserves of the current Yasuní 
conservation initiative are located in the “Intangible Zone” (Larrea & Warnars, 2009). Numerous 
studies indicate that deforestation is significantly facilitated by road access, with significant 
deforestation impacts consistently found in close proximity to paved roads (De Luca, 2007). 
Furthermore, if the ITT oil fields were to be developed with infrastructure and extraction 
facilities, there would be new economic pressures and opportunities to proceed with 
development in the adjacent Block 31 in Yasuní National Park, which, without a road, is 
currently not economically viable (Finer, Moncel, & Jenkins, 2010).  
 
Global Perspectives: The Yasuní-ITT Model and Concerns 
 
The Yasuní-ITT initiative received substantial recent coverage in Ecuadorian newspapers 
from the beginning, fueled by its political implications and growing international interest since it 
was publicly announced by President Rafael Correa in November 2007. Using the political 
momentum of the growing environmental awareness at the time, President Rafael Correa 
changed a variety of policies at the interface of conservation and petroleum development, which 
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raised further concern among national actors (Fontaine, 2007, Acosta, Gudynas, Martínez, & 
Vogel, 2009). One was a 2008 declaration that no new extractive activities were to be developed 
in protected areas unless granted special permission from the Ecuadorian Government if the 
project was deemed to be in the interest of the nation. Another was the proposed creation of a 
trust fund administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which would 
be used to finance projects that promote sustainable development, conservation, and social-
development programs. This was part of the larger strategic restructuring in which the Yasuní-
ITT conservation initiative, announced in 2007, was embedded.  
The proposal has been subject to numerous concerns ranging from its conceptual design 
to implementation. Within the proposal is presented a new role for the state itself: that of a 
provider of environmental services, which it does not only for fellow governments (creating, in 
other words, a state-managed global internalization of costs) but also for a heterogeneous, 
voluntary group of international supporters comprised of governmental and non-governmental 
actors. In other words, under the proposal, a state offers its environmental services to a voluntary 
marketplace of heterogeneous actors, which marks an important shift in the fabric of global 
governance and the economic relationships through which environmental services may be 
conducted. 
The initiative has grown alongside increasing inertia in the last couple of years over 
failing climate conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, which raised interest in alternative paths 
of climate change action outside a global consensus. As a result, the initiative has increasingly 
shifted toward a combination of implementation mechanisms and a stronger focus on carbon 
markets. It moves the focus of the idea away from government aid and development-
conservation collaboration toward a more commodified treatment of carbon as a tradable 
economic value on the global scale. New proposed versions include not only debt-for-
conservation swaps and donations of specific projects promoting sustainable social and 
environmental development, but also the sale of “Yasuní Guarantee Certificates” for carbon 
credits, which have gained interest within Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism, considering 
the estimated 407 million tons of carbon dioxide that would be avoided by leaving the oil 
reserves untouched (Rival, 2010).  
The initiative’s carbon aspects could become synchronized with the requirements and 
operational practices of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) and be marketable, 
for example, in the European Trading System (Finer et al., 2010). The certificate sales would 
build a trust fund with the interest re-invested in sustainable development projects in Ecuador 
(Finer et al., 2010). The initiative is also in accordance with the Convention for Biological 
Diversity in 1992 and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989, providing a 
gateway for countries that signed these conventions to support the Yasuní-ITT initiative as an 
embodiment of the fundamental values of these international agreements. 
Ecuador’s governance and infrastructure have raised significant questions about its 
financial and project-related implementation mechanisms, control and governance 
accountability, performance indicators, planning and assessment approaches, long-term 
implications for Yasuní, and beyond. Unresolved questions remain about the specific 
mechanisms and procedures to be implemented regarding carbon measurement and 
quantification, monitoring and enforcement, ecological uncertainties, and the cost-bearing 
responsibilities for all these in practice. Similarly, these have become issues of growing concern 
in the recent REDD literature on adverse implementation impacts from environmental integrity 
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to socio-economic incentives, livelihood security, as well as  power and governance issues 
(Huettner, 2012; Karsenty & Ongolo, 2012; Pettenella & Brotto, 2012; Lederer, 2012). 
Economic measures of the values of the ITT oil reserves are another example. The Yasuní-ITT 
Initiative strategically emphasized the value of the ITT oil reserves in stored carbon (in metric 
tons) as opposed to the extractable oil (in barrels) because the latter would be subject to strong 
fluctuations over time due to world market prices (Warnars, 2010), and there was a need for 
relatively steady values for the project’s long-term valorization and negotiation. Especially the 
ecological and economic measurement of actual “avoidance” itself in environmental degradation 
remains unclear, mirroring a central concern of REDD mechanisms (Rival, 2009).  
Key questions also emerge at the interface between environmental service payments and 
local forest livelihoods, such as whether the Yasuní agreement would become a top-down 
arrangement and what forms of effective local engagement can be employed to implement 
institutionally sustainable implementation practices that benefit Amazon forest dwellers. Further, 
Ecuador’s future orientation of government practices between petro-state and eco-state remains 
uncertain, and the extent of the Yasuní contribution in the country’s overall picture may be 
overestimated. Lastly, the Yasuní Initiative’s shift toward carbon trade introduces new views of 
environmental services as a global commodity, and raises questions on changing paradigms 
surrounding the linkages of environmental values and their geographical boundedness to land or 
territory.   
One important concern is that Yasuní Guarantee Certificates may not actually lead to the 
reduction of global carbon emissions but instead simply relocate emissions through “leakage” 
(Finer et al. 2010), which has been studied in numerous REDD projects (Atmadja & Verchot, 
2012). The likelihood of future oil drilling in Block 31, adjacent to Yasuní National Park, 
remains unknown and will depend on economic viability in the long run, determined by the 
future cost of access paired with global oil prices. In general, concern exists regarding global oil 
demand and the future value of Ecuador’s oil as it remains untapped until times of even more 
lucrative oil markets. The desires of future administrations and future markets are unknown, and 
it is a concern to those investing in Ecuador that the trust fund will be used responsibly in the 
future.  
As long as the trust fund is under UNDP administration, this may not be an issue, but it 
remains a point that interested contributors must consider (Finer et al. 2010). As a precautionary 
mechanism, the money raised by the ITT initiative is channelled into a UNDP-administered trust 
fund, which may withhold payments to Ecuador if requirements for projects, funds management, 
and government accountability toward the contributing international actors are not met. The 
capital generated from the interest of this trust fund is to be used to finance programs in 
conservation, sustainable technologies, and social development that are supported by the 
National Development Plan (Larrea & Warnars, 2009).  
 
Yasuní and Beyond: Global Networks and the Global Eco-State 
 
The international debate surrounding the Yasuní-ITT Initiative has challenged old and 
new notions of state responsibilities within the ambitions of an eco-state with globally connected 
governance regimes, the diversification of a commodity based economy, and the internalization 
of environmental costs on larger scales. This process has opened new discussions toward a re-
valuation of political options, including conservation as an economic strategy for the state, 
Global Carbon-and-Conservation Models, Global Eco-States? 
                      13 
 
 
national identity elements of nature, and even an international positioning as an eco-state with 
services to the global community.  
In an attempt to promote the cause and urgency of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative further in the 
public, the Ecuadorian government described the consequences of the rapid development of their 
petroleum reserves quite openly and warned that they would be unable to break their reliance on 
the petroleum industry without international assistance. The funds generated by the Yasuní-ITT 
international trust fund could be used to finance programs that promote economic growth in new-
areas, such as the development of renewable energy, and reduce the reliance on petroleum 
extraction within Ecuador (UNDP, 2012). These implementation mechanisms have been thought 
to potentially stimulate increased entrepreneurship in the Ecuadorian economy, and they would 
offer a shift away from the weak levels of entrepreneurship and innovation that are typical for 
petro-states (Karl, 1999).  
More importantly, a public declaration of an “eco-state” also resonates with a political 
strategy to attract environmental funding from international actors, paired with an ecological 
branding strategy to foster stronger investment and economic growth in conservation and 
ecotourism. Through the Yasuní-ITT proposal, Ecuador signalled an attempt to exchange their 
reliance on petroleum extraction with something new, embedded in international assistance to 
compensate for it. Clarification is needed on the extent to which the requested international 
support could go beyond the immediate economic contribution on which the initiative was 
centered. This could potentially include aspects of international influence, control, and decision-
making into the Yasuní arrangement toward a strengthening of Ecuador’s environmental 
governance system, either through formally acknowledged roles or the indirect network 
influences of the international community. Under President Correa, Ecuador’s policies have 
generally moved towards centralized policies, with higher levels of government involvement yet 
relatively low levels of international governance and cooperation.  
The initiative has gained traction through declared political commitment of international 
actors, which boosted the level of interaction and influence between the Ecuadorian state and 
emerging global networks of environmental interests. The Yasuní-ITT agreement would not only 
facilitate but would actually require an increased opening of Ecuador’s government structures 
toward the international community for collaborative decision-making, financial management, 
and local implementation of the conservation agreement. Such a process could (1) facilitate the 
country’s shift toward ecological governance based on resource and knowledge support from the 
international community during the transition, (2) provide support for carbon measurement, 
monitoring, enforcement, local implementation, and benefit strategies, and (3) serve as an 
external control mechanism to aid Ecuador’s struggle against a history of corruption and lack of 
transparency (Seelke, 2008).  
It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the Yasuní Initiative would indeed 
provide a doorway for an environmental shift and implemented features of a global eco-state 
from theory to practice. Since the proposed ecological strategy is primarily based on 
international support and funding, it would be an externally driven transition with strong 
dependencies on global political agendas and markets. More importantly, beyond the concrete 
project, the Yasuní Initiative raises more general questions over old and new paradigms in 
environment-related collaborative action and new carbon initiatives on a global scale. This is 
where the notion of a global eco-state becomes interesting as a new, connected way of 
approaching governance and international environment-development dependencies in a 
globalized world. The global eco-state can only be as strong as its international networks make 
Journal of International and Global Studies 
14 
 
it. Only these global networks are able to create an ecological state whose goals and actions 
transcend national boundaries determined by jurisdiction, economy, and territory. As such, the 
global eco-state is constituted less by the entity itself and more by its network linkages, as they 
form a new overarching unit that allows for new ways to internalize environmental costs beyond 
the national realms. This attributes key importance to international governance relationships, 
collaboration dynamics, political agency, and changing initiatives over time. As Bakker and 
Bridge (2006, p. 19) observed, “agency becomes an emergent property of network associations 
rather than a property inherent in discrete entities.” The strength of a global eco-state is 
determined by the quality of its collaborative ties more so than the quality of its delineated unit. 
This resonates with some recent conceptual shifts away from the singular importance of the 
sovereign state, toward more connected ideas of state networks and multi-scale governance 
dynamics at work.  
Conclusion 
 
The Yasuní-ITT Initiative represents a critical conservation area due to its sensitive 
ecological and cultural significance at a time of strong economic pressures for hydrocarbon 
extraction in the Ecuadorian Amazon. The proposal of the Yasuní-ITT Conservation Initiative, 
its international arrangements, national implementation bodies, and possible local 
implementation strategies have raised many questions and concerns, highlighting the untested 
grounds of the initiative and potentially far-reaching implications as a pilot project for further 
global conservation arrangements.  
This analysis examines the Yasuní-ITT Initiative as a global carbon-and-conservation 
project that may situate Ecuador’s roles of the state, its political positioning, and interests 
precariously between environmental governance on one hand and neoliberal interests on the 
other. The Yasuní case study is further used for an exploration of the concept of the global eco-
state as a globalized extension of Duit’s (2008) “ecological state.” While the ecological state is 
based on the national internalization of environmental costs, the global eco-state represents a 
globally connected form of the ecological state in which international support networks are 
crucial for the internalization of environmental costs on a trans-national scale.   
If the Yasuní-ITT Initiative reaches an agreement between the Ecuadorian government 
and international sponsors, it could introduce a new trans-national generation of carbon-and-
conservation agreements that not only attempt an internalization of environmental costs but do so 
through states as central market actors themselves. This could affect the ways in which states 
engage with global markets and plan their economic strategies. As a positive effect, positioning 
Ecuador as a global environmental service provider could create economic alternatives beyond 
its strong petroleum dependency (Rival, 2010), and it may provide both momentum and funding 
for an internal transition toward a more sustainable governance and economy. As important 
concerns to address, such an agreement may create new dependencies, including global carbon 
pricing and globalized financing structures in the emerging carbon economy, underlying shifts of 
carbon and power between a “Carbon South” and a “Carbon North,” scalar challenges of trans-
national agreements and their local implementation on the ground, and—as a larger democratic 
process—the necessary national public support for an ecological restructuring of the state.   
Notwithstanding the future of the Yasuní-ITT Initiative itself, the international interest 
surrounding it calls for closer examination of the global community of environment-development 
practitioners, policy researchers, and nature-society theorists alike. Taking an idea such as the 
ecological state to a trans-national level for global carbon-and-conservation arrangements would 
Global Carbon-and-Conservation Models, Global Eco-States? 
                      15 
 
 
take the requirements of connectivity, exchange, and control to a global level, including those of 
governmental transparency and direct accountability (Duit, 2008). Ultimately, this raises 
questions about future conceptualizations not only of national economies but of the sovereign 
state as it becomes increasingly interwoven into a global fabric of dependencies. The 
implications are multifold and include complex arrays of problems, including changing 
ecological and economic valorization paradigms in globalized environmental services, the 
commodification of carbon, the globalized outsourcing of carbon sequestration and emerging 
global power imbalances, and the rethinking of international support networks as they become 
increasingly crucial in internalizing environmental costs on global scales. The resulting changes 
may mark the beginning of an era of global eco-states if carbon trade, payments for 
environmental services, and a general commodity-based approach to environmental degradation 
and climate change under a neoliberal paradigm continue.  
                                                            
1 Carbon offsetting refers to the reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide in a particular location or by a particular 
entity in order to compensate for (or offset) the emissions made elsewhere. 
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